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The portions of Professor Kaufmann's book which are of
particular interest to lawyers, legal philosophers and political
theorists are, I think, the passages in which he discusses justice,
guilt and equality. Although these topics-or at least the first two
of them-are picked out for emphasis in the title of the book,
they are in an important sense merely incidental elements in a
discussion which moves beyond them.
The main theme of the book is moral autonomy, as distinguished from legal or political autonomy. Professor Kaufmann
has not set out to write on political theory or legal theory, nor is
he concerned with the sociology of law or government. He is
concerned with liberation of the mind from certain psychological
and intellectual fetters which, in his view, have prevented us
from achieving our full potential as responsible human beings.
His intentions are made clear in the first two paragraphs of his
short preface:
To those whose minds are not liberated, wars, revolutions, and radical movements will never bring freedom but only an exchange of one kind of slavery for
another. That is one of the most tragic lessons of the
twentieth century.
Liberation of the mind is no panacea, but without it
angry rhetoric and cruel bloodbaths are of no avail, and
tyranny endures. Most of those who see themselves as
radicals and revolutionaries still cling to decrepit ideas
like justice and equality and depend on guilt and fear,
as our fathers and mothers did. What we need is a new
autonomous morality.'
As this passage makes plain, Professor Kaufmann considers
that conventional views--or what he takes to be conventional
views-on justice, guilt and equality are incompatible with a truly
autonomous morality. The controlling assumption is that if we
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understand what an autonomous morality would be, we can
hope to overcome the psychological and intellectual obstacles
which prevent its achievement. Among such obstacles are certain
moral and legal preoccupations, including those mentioned.
Such an approach makes it unnecessary to consider the sort of
problems considered by jurists and legal philosophers like
Austin, Holmes, Gray, Llewellyn, Frank, Kelsen, Perelman, Lon
Fuller, H.L.A. Hart or Roscoe Pound, none of whom are mentioned. One assumes (though Professor Kaufmann does not
explicitly say so) that all such writers are mired in old legalities
and moralities which fail to liberate the mind. By contrast,
Professor Kaufmann sketches a "new integrity" rooted in autonomy, claiming that, "Now autonomy appears as the goal of a
historical development: the autonomous man is the modern
counterpart of 'the just man' of the ancient Greeks and Hebrews.
He does not bow to authority; he decides for himself."'2 Thus we
move toward new horizons. It should be added, however, that
Professor Kaufmann does not accept the "new integrity" simply
because it is new or because he regards it as the product of an
historical determinism; he explicitly rejects wave-of-the-future
thinking and discounts historical determinism. He values the
"new integrity" because he considers it appropriate and necessary to modern conditions.
Professor Kaufmann's conception of moral autonomy deserves attention because it is original and important. I am not
sure that it has all the implications and consequences which
Professor Kaufmann claims for it, but in order to consider this
question it is necessary first to make clear, at least in outline,
what his conception of autonomy is. Instead of identifying autonomy broadly with freedom to do whatever one wants (he is no
anarchist) or with freedom to choose whatever one desires (he
rejects hedonism) or with the rational capacity of the individual
to prescribe to himself universal laws by which to test the validity
of particular choices and decisions (he rejects all forms of Kantianism), Professor Kaufmann identifies autonomy with a certain
mode or style of decisionmaking. In this respect, his position has
something in common with that of certain existentialists. However, Professor Kaufmann explicitly rejects the view (associated
with Heidegger) that resoluteness of choice is itself the mark of
authenticity, since on that theory a blind decision to accept
authority, such as a firm resolve to follow Hitler, would stand as
an expression of autonomy. "Autonomy," Professor Kaufmann
says at the outset, "consists of making with open eyes the decisions that give shape to one's life."'3 Autonomy is involved in
2
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"fateful" decisions, as distinguished from trivial decisions. Having open eyes means (as he develops his view, especially in the
later chapters of his book) being guided by certain canons of
rationality and intellectual honesty in making fateful decisions.
There are certain "imperatives" of rationality4 which demand
not only that all questions of meaning should be faced-the
autonomous man is not misled by cliches and slogans-but also
that all the alternative possibilities and their consequences should
be carefully explored and all preconceptions examined. The
autonomous decisionmaker stands on his own feet, resisting the
pressures of authority and conformity (including the conformities of militant nonconformists), and faces courageously the
risks and uncertainties which are implicit in all crucial decisions.
In a world which he knows to be "capricious and cruel,' 5 he
accepts the fact that autonomy is unlikely to bring happiness (at
least in the conventional sense of "happiness"). He also recognizes that some degree of "alienation" or estrangement is not
only inevitable but necessary for any sort of creative achievement. "What people really desire most," asserts Professor Kaufmann, "is to live creative lives."'6 He concedes that this claim
cannot be proved, but is nevertheless convinced that all individuals are potentially creative. And moral autonomy, as he conceives
it, is a form of creativity.
Such a rough and summary sketch scarcely does justice to
Professor Kaufman's conception of autonomy, but it may serve
to show that he puts forward an ideal model of rational, honest
and courageous decisionmaking and holds that one achieves
autonomy by conforming to that model. Some characters in
history and fiction are cited as examplars, including Prometheus,
Clytemnestra, Socrates, Goethe, Eleanor Roosevelt and, most
notably in our own times, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, to whom the
book is dedicated. (Nietzsche is also included in the list but
apparently for his views rather than for his actual life.) Clearly
Professor Kaufmann is not an irrationalist. He rejects "moral
rationalism" because he thinks it makes moral decisionmaking
too cut-and-dried; it discounts the quandaries and the "dizziness"
of moral struggle by ascribing to reason a power which it does
not possess. But rationality has nevertheless an important role in
moral decisions: it helps us to avoid bad decisions and
7
commitments.
As I have already suggested, I think Professor Kaufmann's
conception of moral autonomy has much to recommend it. He
4See id. 178.
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cuts through many tangles and explodes many fashionable misconceptions, such as those surrounding the concept of alienation.
He is entirely right, I think, in claiming that honesty means more
than sincerity and that there is something fundamentally dishonest about blind commitments of any sort, even a commitment to
a cause which is good. He is also correct, I think, in insisting that,
while autonomy is a necessary condition of virtue, it is not a
sufficient condition since the autonomous person might still be a
monster of cruelty if he lacks love and compassion. These points,
and many others, are excellently made. It remains to consider
whether his views about guilt, justice and equality are equally
persuasive. I do not think they are. It seems to me that even if
one subscribes to his conception of mordil autonomy, one cannot
dispense with the concepts of justice, equality and guilt, and that
Professor Kaufmann has on these points misconceived the issues.
It is important first to notice the manner in which Professor
Kaufmann has approached these issues, because his procedure
seems to invite certain confusions. He does not begin (as I have
done) by expounding his views on autonomy at the outset. Had
he done so, he would then have been in a position to indicate
clearly what obstacles stand in the iay of our achieving the kind
of autonomous morality which he envisions. Generally, one
needs to understand what one is seeking in order to understand
what to avoid. Professor Kaufmann has proceeded in the opposite direction. He begins his book by discussing the obstacles to
autonomy, on the theory that by knowing what to avoid we can
learn what we are to seek. 8 The reader is told in the first chapter
that if we are to achieve autonomy, the main danger to be
avoided is something called decidophobia. What is decidophobia?
It is defined as fear of autonomy. ("The fear of autonomy is a
nameless dread, which leaves me free to coin a name for it:
decidophobia."9) Thus the reader is enmeshed in a puzzling kind
of circularity. He does not yet know what autonomy is, except
that it is claimed to be the object of a special kind of fear,
hitherto unrecognized and nameless, to which the author has
elected to give a name. How is the reader to detect the existence
of this newly recognized fear? Only by observing that it operates
to destroy autonomy.
The puzzle is not resolved by Professor Kaufmann's ensuing
account of the ten "strategies" of decidophobia, since the supposed "strategies" turn out to be sometimes compatible with
autonomy. The first "strategy" of decidophobia is specified as
religion, but the author concedes that allegiance to a religion is
8"The first chapter explains the meaning of autonomy by showing what lures and
strategies must be resisted to achieve it." Id. vii.
9

Id. 3.

1974]

BOOK REVIEW

not always prompted by decidophobia. 10 At least several of the
other supposed "strategies" of decidophobia, such as allegiance
to a movement, allegiance to a school of thought, and marriage,
are on the same footing. Their status is thus ambiguous. One
does not learn what autonomy is or what decidophobia is by
considering activities that might be prompted by motives having
nothing to do with autonomy.
Consider, for example, allegiance to a "school of thought."
It is coming to be recognized that thinking never occurs in a
vacuum, but always in a context or framework involving certain
underlying assumptions and presuppositions, most of which are
accepted unconsciously. It seems that one of the most difficult
and demanding of intellectual jobs is that of challenging the
basic framework of ideas to which one is accustomed. Hence the
resistance of scientists, for example, to radically new ways of
conceiving the physical world." Are we to say that
decidophobia-i.e. fear of autonomy-is at work in such cases? It
is not impossible. Yet other explanations seem at least equally
plausible, ranging from professional jealousy to lack of imagination and sheer inability to grasp a new angle of vision.
Again, while it seems plausible to believe that someone who
has actually experienced the pangs of moral or intellectual bewilderment might come to fear it and flee accordingly to the
security of ready-made doctrine, it seems less plausible to suppose that someone who had never experienced such bewilderment should have the same fear. Yet Professor Kaufmann claims
to find decidophobia operating the same way in both cases. He
invokes it not only to explain why unhappy doubters reach for
certainty, but also why those who have been brought up with
certainties cling blindly to them. I think other explanations are
more probable.
In short, I find the whole conception of decidophobia vague
and problematical. The suspicion arises that it serves chiefly as a
rhetorical device to stack the cards (somewhat illegitimately and
quite unnecessarily) in favor of Professor Kaufmann's conception of autonomy. The word "phobia" not only carries an adverse connotation but it implies an object. If there is such a thing
as autonomy-phobia in Professor Kaufmann's sense (which is
what decidophobia amounts to), then there must be such a thing
as autonomy in Professor Kaufmann's sense. I think the case
would be stronger if decidophobia were left out. Since autonomy
in Professor Kaufmann's sense is difficult to achieve, there are
many possible reasons for falling short. Nothing is gained, as far
as I can see, by postulating a special psychological fear of it. Why
10 Id. 8.
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could we not as readily postulate a special fear of 'wisdom
-perhaps called sophiaphobia-to account for the existence of
stupidity?
After discussing decidophobia, Professor Kaufmann moves
on to justice and guilt, both of which are treated as obstacles to
autonomy. His second chapter, entitled "The Death of Retributive Justice," opens as follows:
The road to autonomy is blocked by a two-headed
dragon. One head is Guilt, the other Justice. Justice
roars: "You have no right to decide for yourself; you
have been told what is good, right, and just. There is
one righteous road, and there are many unrighteous
ones. Turn back and seek justice!"
Frightened, man stops and marvels at his own presumption, when Guilt cries: "Those who succeed in
getting past Justice are devoured by Guilt. Seek the
road to which Justice directs you and dare not to strike
out on paths of your own." Guilt has a thousand eyes to
swallow you, and the lids above and below each are
lined with poison fangs. Turn back: autonomy is
sacrilege. 2
It is evident from the tone and content of these passages
that Professor Kaufmann is condemning the concepts of justice
and guilt largely because he associates them with authoritarian
conceptions of law and morality. This association of ideas colors
his analysis and severely restricts its scope.
When jurists, legal philosophers and political scientists discuss problems of justice, they are generally concerned with the
validity of legal systems or particular kinds of laws. Under what
circumstances and by what criteria, if any, might a legal system
or a particular law be judged to be just? How are different
systems of law or different types of legal enactments to be
compared in respect of justice? In this context concepts of
justice, far from presupposing the existence and validity of a
repressive and authoritarian system, are invoked as a basis for
questioning whether and how far authoritarian systems are acceptable. Of course concepts of justice vary. Positivists like
Kelsen hold that the concept of justice is purely subjective, while
others, like Lon Fuller and adherents of natural law or natural
rights, consider that objective grounds can be found for it. Other
views fall between the extremes. H.L.A. Hart, for example, while
admitting a "minimum content" of natural law, propounds a
generally positivistic theory of law though he rejects the view that
12 KAUFMANN
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laws are merely commands.' 3 Hart also believes (as reflected in his
well-known debates with Lord Devlin) that the power of the state
to regulate the private conduct of the individual should be
restricted, and an active debate is continuing as to where the
limits of public authority should be established. 4 Such debates,
of course, deal directly with the autonomy of the individual in its
legal and political dimensions, i.e. with respect to the propriety of
externally imposed limitations. Questions of justice figure prominently in discussions of this kind.
Professor Kaufmann ignores such discussions and virtually
ignores the broader aspects and dimensions of the problem of
justice with which they are concerned. He treats the concept
of justice as if it were applicable only within a particular type of
moral or legal system, specifically the authoritarian kind of
system exemplified by the theologically based systems of the old
Testament and the Middle Ages. He objects to the concept of
justice largely because he views it as a consequence or byproduct
of an authoritarian outlook. The truth is that the idea of justice,
like the idea of natural law, can be invoked on both sides of that
issue, depending on circumstances. It can be appealed to not
only in support of authority and conformity but also to challenge
authority and conformity. Professor Kaufmann sees, as it were,
only one side of the coin. I suspect that this is due, in large
measure, to his method of approach. He endeavors, as I have
said, to expound his view of moral autonomy by means of a
discussion of the obstacles to its achievement. Accordingly, justice is treated only in one dimension, i.e. qua obstacle.
The idea of justice, as Professor Kaufmann conceives it, is
rooted in the concept of moral desert: "1J]ustice consists of meting
out to men what they deserve."' 5 He does not tell us who, if anybody,

thinks of justice in this way; 'heseems to assume that this is the
obvious and prevailing interpretation. Against this conception of
justice he puts forward three principal arguments. One is that
since moral desert is incalculable, justice can never be achieved
either in respect to punishments or distributions. (Retributive
justice, as applied to punishments, and distributive justice, as
applied to the allocation of goods and privileges, are the only
aspects of justice which he considers.) The second argument is
that the idea of retributive justice is "dead" and that the idea of
distributive justice, its "Siamese twin"' 6 is moribund. The third
argument-less clearly developed than the other two-is that the
13See

'4 See
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concept of justice is superfluous, since other concepts are available to serve all its necessary and legitimate purposes. I shall
consider these contentions in order and then turn to certain
incidental observations which Professor Kaufmann puts forward
en passant but does not develop. I would suggest that some of the
incidental observations are more significant than the main arguments, and that if they were followed up, different conclusions
would emerge.
1. The Problem of Moral Desert. Professor Kaufmann contends that moral desert is incalculable; hence, justice can -never
be achieved in respect to either punishments or distributions. He
does not conclude that punishments should be given up; on the
contrary, he insists that punishments must be retained to make
laws effective. He also concedes that distributions of goods and
privileges must continue to be made. His contention is that we
should cease talking about justice; we should accept the fact that
punishments and distributions are necessary but that they can
never be just. In effect, he contends that the concept of justice is
empty. Hence it can serve no purpose except those of rhetoric
and repression. This novel argument is arresting, but not, I
think, persuasive.
Let us concede to Professor Kaufmann that perfect justice
can never be done, and that we cannot even imagine an instance
of perfect justice. Does it follow from this fact that the notion of
justice is empty? I think not. Surely we can distinguish between
better and worse without having to know what is best. If justice is
susceptible to degrees, as I think it is, we need not know what the
ideally just society would be in order to determine that certain
kinds of laws and institutions are less just than other kinds.
As to the connection between justice and moral desert, it
seems to me that the idea of moral desert is derived from the
idea of justice, not vice versa. If so, the fact that desert cannot be
precisely calculated on an absolute scale is a consequence of the
fact that we have no idea of absolute and perfect justice. The
idea of desert is always relative to some legal or moral system.
Given a particular system of law or morals, we can say (at least
approximately) what an individual deserves within that system.
We can also judge whether the system, or certain aspects of it,
including the conceptions of desert to which it gives rise, is more
or less just than alternative systems. In brief, if there were some
agreed system of absolute justice, we could derive from it an
absolute scale for measuring moral desert. But lacking an agreed
model of absolute justice, we also lack an absolute measure of
desert.
To illustrate: Consider three systems of taxation, (a) a poll
tax under which every citizen is required to pay a fixed sum, say
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$5, annually, (b) a flat-rate income tax under which every
citizen is required to pay a fixed percentage of income, say 5%,
annually, (c) a graduated income tax under which the poorest
citizens pay nothing while richer citizens are required to pay at
progressively higher rates as their incomes rise. In choosing
among these systems, we can say with fair assurance, I think, that
although none is perfectly just, the second is relatively more just
than the first, and the third more just than the second, because
greater account is taken of ability to pay. Can we say that any of
these systems is deserved? I think not. But once any of these
systems is adopted, we can say what each individual ought to pay
under it, thereby fixing his deserts under the system in question.
If he pays what he owes, he deserves all the privileges accorded to
a law-abiding taxpayer; if he fails to pay, he deserves some sort of
penalty.
I think Professor Kaufmann is wrong, therefore, in saying
that 'Justice consists in meting out to men what they deserve."
Justice under a given system may consist of treating men as they
deserve under that system, but justice may also demand a
modification of the system and a consequent alteration in the
concept of what is deserved. It is worth noting in this connection
that Professor Kaufmann makes no mention of the concept of
obligation, although desert and obligation are closely related. I
shall discuss this matter in connection with his theories about
guilt.
2. The Death of Retributive Justice. In announcing the death
of retributive justice, Professor Kaufmann seems to mean that
the retributive theory of punishment is no longer taken seriously. It is true that some writers have rejected the retributive
theory as barbaric and inhumane. However, other recent writers
of considerable eminence have pointed out that the retributive
theory must be taken seriously since it gives certain protection to
individual rights which deterrence theories and rehabilitation
theories do not provide.17 We should also note that in the New
York Times Magazine for October 28, 1973, Professor James Q.
Wilson, a political scientist writing on The Death Penalty, concludes after surveying the data that the deterrent effect of capital
punishment cannot be proved or disproved by any kind of
sociological investigations. Hence the basic issue must be one of
justice. His final paragraph puts the matter as follows:
The main issue remains that of justice-the point is
not whether capital punishment prevents future crimes,
but whether it is a proper and fitting penalty for crimes
7
1 See, e.g., H.L.A.
note 14.

HART,

PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY

(1968); H.

PACKER,

supra

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:745

that have occurred. That is probably as it should be, for
such a question forces us to weigh the value we attach to
human life against the horror in which we hold a
heinous crime. Both that value and that horror change
over time. In our modern culture we seem to be uncomfortable about considering these matters, and thus both
proponents and opponents of execution fall back on
"scientific" assertions about deterrence that are not only
dubious but are likely to remain so. The quality of
public debate would 18be substantially improved if all,
sides recognized this.
Without going into the relevant issues here, it seems evident that
the retributive theory of justice is not dead, but alive-and
kicking.
3. Alternatives to Justice. Professor Kaufmann suggests that if
we abandoned the idea of justice, we should lose nothing since
other concepts are available to perform its legitimate functions.
He is not interested, however, in merely substituting one word
for another.' 9 Let us consider briefly some of the substitutes or
surrogates which might be available.
Many writers associate justice with equality. But neither
equality nor equality of opportunity would be acceptable to
Professor Kaufmann since he unequivocally rejects both concepts. His position can be summarized in his own words:
Equality of opportunity is a slogan, and those who
employ it are not really in favor of the means required
to bring it about. Men are not equal. Men should not be
made equal. And equality of opportunity is either a
hollow clich6 or a pernicious goal.
My claim that men are not equal and that equality is
a myth does not entail any bigotry .... My point is that
no two men or women are alike. . . . All men and
women are brothers and sisters, and each should be
considered as an individual. Giving the same to all is not
particularly reasonable, seeing that they are not alike,
do not have the same desires, and cannot all use the
same things or opportunities.2 °
The short answer to this contention is that the words "equal"
and "equality" have various meanings. To say that one thing
18Wilson, The Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), 26, 48.
11 "[W]hat I object to is not so much the continued use of the words just' and 'justice'
as it is a way of thinking that affects the way people behave.... Invocations of justice
help to blind a moral agent to the full range of his choices. Thus they keep people from
realizing
the extent of their autonomy." KAUFMANN 93-94.
20
1d. 85.
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equals another thing may mean that the two things are alike. But
more often it means that despite dissimilarities they are equivalent in worth or value. We say "like as two peas," not "equal as
two peas." On the other hand, when exchange rates are quoted
between different currencies we say that so many francs are
"equal" to so many British pounds or so many American dollars,
meaning simply that a balance can be struck between them.
Which sense of "equality" is employed in the historic claim
that all men are created equal? Obviously the second, not the
first. Nobody has ever seriously claimed, I think, that all human
beings are exactly alike; differences in stature, disposition and
capacities are too evident to be ignored. The doctrine of equality
means rather that all individuals are equal in worth despite differences in status or abilities. Some historians have traced this conception, which is not found in all cultures, to the Judaeo-Christian
view that all souls are equally precious in the sight of God.
Whatever its origin, equality of opportunity is clearly predicated upon the view that all men are not alike. To find out which
man can run the fastest we start all competitors together. If we
give the prize to the winner, it is because we consider it fitting to
reward the special capacity he has demonstrated in winning.
Indeed it seems plain that if all individuals were regarded as
alike-if they were seen as fungible units interchangeable with
one another for all purposes-the ideals of equality and equality
of opportunity would never have arisen.
If these ideals are open to objection, it is either on the
ground that they have not been fully achieved, or on the
theory-now being advanced by some writers-that it is unjust to
discriminate against incapacity. Professor Kaufmann has no patience with this last view, and in this I think he is right. But he is
mistaken in accepting the premise on which it rests, i.e., that
equality means likeness in all respects, and that justice, therefore,
precludes the recognition of individual differences. If this were
the case, justice might operate as an obstacle to the moral
autonomy of the individual, as Professor Kaufmann claims. But
it is not the case. The ideal of equality does not deny individual
differences, but presupposes them, and looks for ways by which
they can be allowed to emerge without denying the intrinsic
worth of every individual qua human being.
This point is especially important because current discussions of the possible connection between racial inheritance and
particular capacities seem to be frequently infected by the same
error. Suppose it were established that a statistical correlation
exists between racial origin and certain intellectual or physical
abilities. Suppose that racial group A is found to have, on the
average, a higher intellectual competence than group B, while
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group B has, on the average, greater athletic capacity than group
A. Would such findings (if made) justify any conclusions about
individual members of either group? Clearly not. Presumably
there are many individual members of group B with very high
intellectual capacities and many members of group A with very
high physical capacities. The ideal of equality, which applies to
individuals and not to groups, demands that every member of
either group should be treated solely on his or her individual
merits without regard to statistical generalizations of any sort.
Prejudice and bigotry get a foothold when this is forgotten and
when equality is mistakenly interpreted as implying universal
likeness. I repeat:' the ideal of equality presupposes individual
differences; hence the assertion that differences exist-whether
among individuals or between groups of individuals-does not
discredit the ideal but confirms its importance.
In any case, since Professor Kaufmann rejects the concept of
equality, he could not accept it as a surrogate for the concept of
justice if the latter were eliminated. Would fairness serve the
purpose? Evidently not. While Professor Kaufmann accepts the
concept of fairness, he asserts quite categorically that fairness
and justice are different, and he specifically attacks Professor
Rawls for his recent attempt to develop a conception of justice as
fairness. 2 I According to Professor Kaufmann, "[F]airness is preeminently a quality of procedures and not of results ... , while
'just' is pre-eminently a predicate ascribed to results and
specifically to what is meted out. '2 2 This seems to involve a
distinction without a difference. On whatever basis we may
choose to distinguish between "substantive" laws and "procedural" rules, the fact remains that no substantive principles are
automatically self-executing or self-applying; rules of procedure
are always implicated in the actual determination of concrete
cases. It follows that any determination of the justice of the
"results" of any litigation must take account of the procedural
aspects. Whether we speak of "fairness" or 'justice," the two
aspects cannot be separated-much less opposed-as suggested
by Professor Kaufmann, for the reason that procedures affect
substantive results. Thus if a man were sentenced to prison
without a fair trial, we should consider the result unjust, not
because we necessarily believe him innocent but because we
believe that his guilt was not properly established. I think that
Professor Olafson (to choose one example) was closer to the
truth when he observed that, "More specifically, it would seem
that even bad rules can be applied justly and good rules in an
unjust way; and that justice is more a matter of procedural
21 See J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
22 KAUFMANN 69.
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fairness to individuals than of the substantive rightness or
wrongness of the rules themselves. 2 3 And Professor Stone is
surely correct in noting that the idea of "due process" historically
acquired substantive implications only as a consequence of its
originally procedural functions.2 4 In short, Professor Kaufmann
seems mistaken. The fact remains, however, that for Professor
Kaufmann, fairness and justice are so different that the former
could not be accepted as a substitute for the latter.
We come to honesty, which Professor Kaufmann seems to
regard as the best candidate for replacing justice. He points out
correctly that scrupulous honesty in observing and applying the
prescribed rules would serve many of the ends of justice. Would
it cover all of them? What about punishing the innocent? Professor Kaufmann discusses this point, arguing that honesty would
prevent our punishing for a breach of the law a person who had
not in fact broken it.2 5 But suppose the law itself provided that
children were to be punished for the crimes of their ancestors, or
that innocent hostages might be punished if any acts of violence
occurred in their communities? Laws and customs of this sort
have actually existed. We resist such laws and customs, I think,
because we have come to regard them as fundamentally unjust.
In such cases, an appeal to honesty would be irrelevant. Here we
come up against the same inadequacy in Professor Kaufmann's
concept of justice which was noted earlier: he fails to recognize
that the concept of justice can serve as a ground for challenging
the validity of laws and systems of law. In this connection he talks
of "inhumanity," asserting that laws can be inhumane, e.g., the
laws of England which prescribed execution for petty theft. I
think we can readily agree that such laws were indeed inhumane.
The question remains whether so vague a concept would give
any guidance in less dramatic situations. Could an arbitrary
system of taxation, for example, be attacked (except rhetorically)
as inhumane? I think not.
I note in this connection that while Professor Kaufmann
argues that the idea of justice should be dispensed with, there
are some passages which seem to suggest that we are nevertheless entitled to speak of injustice. 26 He also suggests that though
we can never say absolutely what people deserve, we can say in
some cases what they do not deserve, e.g., capital punishment for
petty theft. 27 I find such suggestions puzzling. If the concept of
justice is "decrepit," can the concept of injustice be any less so? If
desert is incalculable, how can we calculate what is undeserved?
23 F.A. OLAFSON, SOCIETY, LAW AND MORALITY 6 (1961).
24 See J. STONE, HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN JUSTICE 90-91
25 KAUFMANN 133.
26

1d. 86.
1d. 68.
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Without pursuing the inquiry further, I think I hav& said
enough to indicate why Professor Kaufmann's analysis of justice
leaves me as firmly unconvinced as his discussion of
decidophobia-and this despite the fact that I admire his conception of moral autonomy. At the same time, he makes certain
incidental observations which seem to me profoundly important.
They deserve to be followed up.
As to the formal concept of justice, that like cases should be
treated alike, Professor Kaufmann notes that this is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition of material justice. 28 This is entirely
correct. In practice, the crucial question is what similarities and
differences are to be taken as relevant. On this point, Professor
Kaufmann observes that, "Ultimately every attempt to spell out a
material conception ofjustice involves a decision as to the kind of
society we want. It requires a decision about goals and
standards. ' 2 9 This also seems to me correct. But what follows?
Professor Kaufmann concludes merely that moral rationalism is
wrong because the "moral rationalist takes his standards for
granted and refuses to consider alternatives. ' 30 It seems to me
that the point goes far deeper. As Professor Kaufmann observes
elsewhere, "Many disputes about justice . . . are ultimately
disputes about different visions of society and the future one
desires for humanity."'3 1 If this is the case, then justice cannot be
the kind of simplistic concept he takes it to be. Debates about
justice or equality always involve underlying decisions-often
masked behind theories of cognitive intuition-about goals,
standards, norms and ideal visions of man and society. Such
decisions are of at least two kinds. One kind involves the application of established or accepted norms and laws to concrete cases;
they are necessary because no law (whether descriptive or prescriptive) is self-applying. Hence the need for courts and judges.
The other kind of decision involves the critique of the accepted
norms and laws themselves. As Professor Kaufmann recognizes,
we criticize a given set of norms and standards by appealing to
another set, but even the ultimate set is tentative and
provisional.3 2 In the background there is always a judgment
stipulating or postulating the ideal possibilities of man and
society.
There is an increasing convergence of opinion, I believe,
toward this conception of the matter. But if one takes seriously a
view of this sort, it follows that the concept of justice must be
recognized as itself subject to evolution and development. As the
28

Id. 85-86.
-2Id. 80.
Id. 80-81.
3
Id. 89.
32See id. 187.
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individual grows toward increasing autonomy, the problem of
harmonizing his personal needs and aspirations with those of his
neighbors and those of society at large-and ultimately with
those of other men and other societies-becomes increasingly
complex. It is here that justice finds its field of operation. For the
autonomous man must still live in a world of other men, with
whom he must be prepared in some degree to come to terms.
Although Professor Kaufmann attacks the Golden Rule as
"intolerable" 33 the problem of reciprocity remains. Rules of law
and morals are needed, as Professor Kaufmann concedes. Hence
there is also need for a continuing critique of laws and legal
systems in the interests of the kind of autonomy and liberation
for which Professor Kaufmann so eloquently calls.
It remains to say a word about the idea of guilt. Professor
Kaufmann argues powerfully against guilt feelings, which he
regards as constricting and destructive. But he also insists on the
importance of a sense of responsibility and a sense of fault. He
draws a set of distinctions between two kinds of feelings which he
describes as past-oriented and future-oriented, as follows:
past-oriented
guilt
.remorse
contrition
self-accusation
wallowing

future-oriented
fault
regret
humbition [his term for a
blend of humility and ambition]
self-criticism
planning 34

Those feelings listed in the first column are to be shunned and
put aside, while those in the second column are to be cultivated
and developed. Some of the distinctions are subtle, such as that
between remorse and regret, but I shall not discuss that aspect of
the matter. More important for present purposes is the fact that,
in condemning guilt, Professor Kaufmann does not distinguish
sufficiently between subjective guilt (i.e., guilt feelings) and objective guilt (i.e., the factual determination that something forbidden
has been done). He assimilates the two on the theory that guilt in
either sense implies that the guilty party deserves to be punished.
As previously pointed out, though he accepts punishment as
necessary for the enforcement of law, he insists that no punishment is ever deserved since desert is incalculable.
This raises a serious problem, with which Professor Kaufmann does not deal. Suppose we reject the retributive theory of
punishment and adopt a wholly "future-oriented" attitude, holding that punishments are warranted only to deter future wrong2
:

4

Id. 188.
1d. 123.
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doing. Suppose a law is passed to the effect that whoever is
convicted of grand larceny shall be sentenced to jail for a
specified term. Suppose further that the prison term is fixed
solely with reference to its deterrent effect (assuming that this is
calculable). What is the effect of such a law? According to
Kelsen's analysis (which I find persuasive) the effect of such a law
is to generate an ought-or more precisely a cluster of oughts. If
an act of larceny occurs, the law officers are obligated to proceed
in certain ways-i.e., to catch the offender. And the citizens are
also obligated-i.e., they ought not to commit larceny. These
duties are legally established. They may or may not coincide with
the moral sense of the community, but this fact is irrelevant for
present purposes. The point is that laws backed by sanctions
generate obligations. Now if a man violates an obligation-if he
does what he ought not to do-then the notion of guilt is
introduced, at least in the objective sense. The wrongdoer may
have no guilt feelings; he may feel no remorse, but only regret
for having been caught. But a finding that he did in fact commit
the act prohibited, however that finding may be phrased, is
necessarily a finding of objective guilt. And it also establishes that
under the law he deserves the prescribed penalty.
I do not see how these consequences can be avoided. If
Professor Kaufmann had considered the problem of obligation, I
think he might have come to different conclusions about the
concept of desert, with which obligation is intimately connected.
It seems to me that as long as there are laws with penal
sanctions, objective determinations of guilt and desert are inevitable. Professor Kaufmann goes part way toward recognizing this
when he suggests that it was originally the imposition of stipulated rewards and punishments which generated the idea of
desert.35 I think this is probably correct.3 6 But Professor Kaufmann does not seem to see the full implications of this suggestion; he treats it as further proof of the irrationality of the ideas
of guilt and desert, and the need to be rid of them. I would
suggest, on the contrary, that it shows the impossibility of escaping from the ideas of desert and guilt as long as there are rules
of conduct backed by sanctions.
As to guilt feelings, there is a parallel question: Can guilt
feelings be eliminated as long as there are felt obligations? Does
the autonomous man feel obligations of any sort? I should
assume so, since 'Professor
Kaufmann says he would have a
"social conscience. 37 But if he feels obligations, must he not*also
feel guilty (in some sense) if he violates a felt obligation? There is
5

See,
C e.g., id.101-04, 107.

36Cf. .
RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM
37 KAUFMANN 130.

OF EVIL

(1967).

1974]

BOOK REVIEW

761

a problem here which remains unresolved, since Professor
Kaufmann says nothing, as far as I can discover, on the subject
of moral or legal obligation. This omission reflects, I think, a
tendency to vagueness about the concept of responsibility.
To summarize briefly, I find Professor Kaufmann's concept
of moral autonomy important, original and challenging. But his
arguments on guilt, justice and equality are unpersuasive. They
do not do justice-if the word is permissible-to his other work,
which I greatly admire.
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